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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LYNDA F JONES, 
Plaintiff-Appellee 
vs 
ALAN D JONES, 
Defendant-Appellant 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Oral Argument Requested 
Case No. 2004-0192CA 
DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
The Plaintiff-Appellee is Lynda F Jones, a natural 
person. The Defendant-Appellant is Alan D Jones, a 
natural person. To enable the Court to ascertain the 
former spousal roles of the parties, the first names of 
the parties will be frequently used herein: ALAN for 
former husband, LYNDA for former wife, so as to avoid 
confusion which may arise from the traditional 
legalistic terms applied to party-litigants, 
particularly in this "petition to modify" context. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LYNDA F JONES, 
Plaintiff-Appellee 
vs 
ALAN D JONES, 
Defendant-Appellant 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Oral Argument Requested 
Case No. 2004-0192CA 
ALAN JONES [hereinafter "ALAN"] presents the 
following "rebuttal" and "response" arguments to those 
raised in LYNDA JONES' [hereinafter "LYNDA"] BRIEF. 
LYNDA'S FINANCIAL NEEDS 
AND ALAN'S ABILITY TO PAY 
LYNDA asserts [Pages 15-16 of her BRIEF] 
satisfactory compliance with the Jones vs Jones, 770 
P. 2d 1072 (Utah Supreme Court 1985) criteria for an 
alimony award. In Jones the Utah Supreme Court 
identified the three criteria of primary concern in an 
alimony award, thus: 
This Court has described the purpose of 
alimony: " [Tlhe most important function of 
alimony is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living 
she enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent 
the wife from becoming a public charge." 
English v. English, 565 P.2d at 411. With 
this purpose in mind, the Court in English 
articulated three factors that must be 
considered in fixing a reasonable alimony 
award: 
l 
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[1] the financial conditions and 
needs of the wife; 
[2] the ability of the wife to 
produce a sufficient income for 
herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to 
provide support. 
Id. at 411-12 (citations omitted). See also 
Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587 P.2d 144, 147 
(1978); Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 
1218, 1223 (1980). Nowhere in the trial 
court's memorandum decision, its findings of 
fact, or its statements made on the record at 
the conclusion of the hearing is there any 
indication that the court analyzed the 
circumstances of the parties in light of these 
three factors. And our attempt to perform 
this analysis through a review of the record 
evidence compels us to conclude that the trial 
court abused its discretion in fixing the 
alimony award. 
770 P.2d at 1075. Emphasis added. 
The foregoing "judicial" standards (i.e. "factors") 
have been legislatively incorporated into the statute 
applicable to alimony awards, namely Section 3 0-3-
5(a) (7) , Utah Code (which includes additional criteria, 
not necessarily pertinent to this appeal) . [The statute 
avoids the gender-based "husband" and "wife" labels and 
standards which are facially unconstitutional.] 
a. LYNDA7S financial needs. 
As an appendix [pp. A-19 thru A-22 to her BRIEF] , 
LYNDA included her financial declaration which was 
introduced as evidence before the District Court at the 
July 2003 trial. Condensed to its operative "core", the 
7 
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sworn document has the following significant features: 
Gross monthly income: $4,250.00 
Less: monthly deductions: 1,187.72 
Net Monthly Income: $3,062.28 
Monthly expenses: $3,367.00 
Facially, LYNDA'S expenses are a mere $305 in excess of 
her claimed "income". However, upon cross-examination 
concerning her "monthly deductions", LYNDA testified 
that she received a "tax refund" of approximately $2200 
[Testimony of Lynda Jones. TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, 
14 August 2003, pp. 53-54: "$1861" federal refund and 
"$407" state, for a total of $2268) .] When that amount 
[$2268] is divided by twelve (months) , that's in excess 
of $171 per month to be deducted from the "deductions" 
she's claimed, thus to be "added to" (and increasing) 
her "net monthly income (by that $171+ amount) , to 
$3,233 almost within $150 of her claimed "monthly 
expenses" [of #3,367]. 
During ALAN'S cross-examination of LYNDA'S claimed 
(and sworn, under oath) "monthly expenses" as contained 
within her "FINANCIAL DECLARATION TRIAL EXHIBIT #9", 
the District Court abandoned its "neutral" role as an 
impartial fact-finder and became almost an advocate for 
LYNDA. The TRANSCRIPT of the 14 August 2003 reflects 
the following, beginning with the on-going "cross-
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examination" questioning (by Mr Homer, counsel for 
ALAN): 
Question (by Homer) : And the . . . 
THE COURT: And you've allotted nothing for 
clothing; is that correct? 
Ms JONES: No, because when I need clothes 
I usually charge them and that's why I have 
credit card bills, and you know, I am a 
professional person. I am required to dress, 
you know, appropriately for that position.
 ( 
THE COURT: So you do buy clothes, but you 
didn't put clothes in that column. What do you 
think you spend per month in clothing? 
MS. JONES: I'd say $1,000 a year. 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, pages 57, line 23, through 
page 58, line 8. Emphasis added. 
The foregoing "sworn testimony" evidence is 
significant, for two reasons: 
First, LYNDA'S "monthly" clothing "expense" is 
less than $85 per month ($1000 per year, 
divided by twelve months). 
Secondly, the "clothing expense" is apparently < 
"double-counted" in the $975 per month "credit 
card" expense described below. 
Ultimately, the COURT departing again from its role 
as a neutral fact-finder hearing the testimonial 
evidence again assumed the role of an advocate and 
i 
raised the "clothing expense" to $3 00 per month. The 
Court's written "finding" on this item is thus: 
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8. This Court finds that the Petitioner's 
attested unmet financial need of $300.00 per 
month is understated. By taking into account 
the reasonable amount of expenses associated 
with clothing and dry-cleaning, this Court 
finds that the petitioner's unmet financial 
needs are closer to $500.00 per month. 
RECORD at pp. 282-283. FINDINGS OF FACT. Emphasis 
added. Not only does this evidence ignore the 
arithmetic calculation (to "add back in" as "income" 
the $171+ excessively taken as an income tax 
withholding) , but "double-counts" the clothing expense, 
which the witness testified were/had been charged 
against her credit cards. 
The monthly expenses in the FINANCIAL DECLARATION--
EXHIBIT #9 include an amount of $975.00, which 
notwithstanding the word "specify", weren't. Upon 
cross-examination by ALAN's counsel, LYNDA acknowledged 
that such payments were for "credit card payments", for 
indebtednesses incurred after ALAN'S unemployment 
terminated the alimony revenue she had received. 
Examined in the long-run, several observations and 
conclusions are warranted: 
First, given the fact that LYNDA received 
"advanced warning" of ALAN' s economic plight--
-months before he had attempted to work with 
her to "settle out" the perpetual alimony 
claims, and she wouldn't LYNDA runs out and 
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runs up (claimed) a large "credit card bill" 
for undisclosed expenses. [See TRANSCRIPT OF 
PROCEEDINGS, 14 August 2003, pages 54-55, for 
LYNDA'S testimony on this subject.] Coupled 
with the fact that in November 2000 she was 
"on notice" that the alimony award was 
requested by ALAN to go to zero (for "material 
change of circumstances" reasons resisted by 
LYNDA but nevertheless "found" by the Court 
and now conceded by LYNDA). Thus, unless she 
ran up the $30,000 in the two months 
September 2000 and October 2000 before she 
was "served" with the "modification" petition 
(and her testimony was not that she had done 
so in the two-month period, but had taken a 
couple years to do so), the almost $1000 per 
month amount ought to be deducted from her 
monthly expenses. However, in the context of 
a permanent alimony setting, to utilize the 
$975 amount would be unfair and in the 
judicial vernacular "inequitable": ALAN 
ought not be saddled with permanent, ongoing 
"monthly alimony" based upon (1) obligations 
so unreasonably incurred, and (2) obligations 
which at $975 per month will be "paid off" 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(because the $30,000 in credit card debt will 
be paid down to zero), and lastly (3) LYNDA 
has been awarded albeit improperly 
for/with a "judgment" for $30,000+ for the 
"unpaid alimony" for those same expenses which 
she incurred when ALAN wasn't paying. In like 
fashion, if believed she's "going in the hole" 
at the rate of $200 per month each month, most 
people would "cut back" somewhere: one either 
reduce the incurring of new expenses or one 
reduces the outgoing expenses. This would be 
particularly the case when LYNDA, by then 
having been so served with the "modification 
petition" was "on notice" the alimony might 
drop, and drop significantly, particularly in 
light of her own $40,000 annualized income. 
In similar fashion, LYNDA claims a 
monthly "mortgage payment" of $14 00 + , which in 
today's "reduced interest marketplace" 
purchases a whole lot of house! A "new" house 
acquired post-divorce: LYNDA arguably not only 
is "doing quite well" (particularly vis-a-vis 
ALAN, who doesn't even have his own house), 
but has ostensibly "moved up", as she does not 
live in the former marital residence. That the 
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"mortgage" might be re-financed (and/or some 
day "paid off") has particular bearing on 
LYNDA's claimed "needs". 
Thus, LYNDA'S actual expenses rather than being 
merely a couple hundred dollars "in the hole" when 
properly understood are not merely a "negative $200" 
compared to monthly revenues but rather are, in the 
long-term, hundreds and hundreds of dollars "ahead" of 
her income. 
b. LYNDA'S ability to support herself. 
LYNDA earns $5 0,000 per year; ALAN earns about 
$16,000-17,000. She's certainly able to support 
herself. She is in no danger of becoming a "public 
charge". 
Obviously, everyone given the opportunity can 
have "needs" (actually "wants", disguised as "needs" or 
described as "expenses", many of which are reflective 
of discretionary choices). Everyone, given the 
opportunity, can spend as much money as they have, 
particularly when the spender as the case in an 
alimony situation doesn't have to "earn it". 
c. ALAN'S ability to provide support. 
ALAN disagree's vigorously with LYNDA'S and the 
District Court's characterization that he "voluntarily 
terminated" his employment (as a District Sales 
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Manager, with Lawson Fasteners) and the implications 
thereof. That he voluntarily terminated his employment 
IS TRUE. What is incorrect and misleading is the 
inference LYNDA (and, arguably, the District Court) 
would draw that ALAN voluntarily quit is $70,000 per 
year position. He didn't. ALAN testified that at the 
time he actually quit [during the spring or summer of 
2000] he was facing a situation where, as a result of 
the corporate pay-scale re-structuring, his "earnings" 
would decrease from the $60, 000-to-$70, 000 range, to an 
annualized amount in the $23,000-range. While the 
District Court didn't want to believe the $23,000 
annualized earning ALAN was anticipating, it is 
nevertheless the truth. And the District Court is 
certainly not at liberty to disregard such sworn 
testimony. [ALAN wouldn't have documentary evidence of 
that amount, because he didn't stick around with Lawson 
waiting to earn that significantly diminished amount.] 
As noted previously in ALAN'S opening BRIEF, it 
would have been unreasonable and unrealistic given 
the fact that he had the "alimony obligation" (as it 
has been referred to, although not necessarily with 
that exact phrasing) of $16,800 per year that he 
would be expected to sustain that "alimony obligation" 
(District Court's frequently-utilized term) when his 
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entire "takehome" pay (income of $23k, less withholding 
deductions for income taxes, etc.) would likely be not 
too much more than the $16,800 he was expected to be 
paying LYNDA in alimony! Thus, it was entirely 
reasonable for ALAN to leave his employment with 
Lawson. [In similar vein, it would be interesting 
hypothetically to ascertain how the District Court 
would have handled ALAN'S employment, at Lawson, at the 
$23,000 annual earnings amount. One can safely assume 
that LYNDA wanting $16,800 per year from his $16k 
earnings would want the same amount from his $23k 
annual earnings!] 
To characterize ALAN'S situation as 
"underemployment" as the Court does as recited by 
LYNDA'S BRIEF, quoting the Court evidences a judicial 
misunderstanding of the facts and a disregard of the 
legal standards governing the alimony award: arguably 
bordering on an "abuse of discretion". Indeed, the 
District Court's continuing characterization of the 
"voluntary quit" (undersigned's terminology) situation, 
while simultaneously ignoring the economic realities of 
the situation, and the District Court's pre-occupation 
with the "obligations" analysis with its result that 
ALAN cannot move to Montana, because there are no sales 
manager jobs in that State (not that the District Court 
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expressly said it that way, but ALAN is nevertheless 
penalized for having done so, without checking 
beforehand) . As the issue is (was) seemingly framed by 
the District Court, ALAN is judicially condemned if he 
does quit and/or judicially condemned if he doesn't 
(quit and look for something better) . At times, the 
District Court was seemingly almost indignant over the 
concept that ALAN, having "obligations" (to pay 
alimony) , would terminate his employment with Lawson 
which was proposing to pay him one-third of what he had 
been earning, but for the same quantity of work as 
before. [Who wouldn't, in those circumstances, likewise 
quit?] Indeed, it is practically impossible to avoid 
such a judicial "challenge" to the Court's "authority" 
(to order the payment of the alimony) , or minimally the 
appearance of such a challenge, given the fact that 
LYNDA had filed the several "order to show cause" 
proceedings for the alleged "contempt" arising from 
ALAN's failure to pay. Initially, the District Court 
faced with ALAN'S evidence that it was physically and 
financially impossible for him to pay the $1600 per 
month as originally ordered allowed him to pay $100 
per month. RECORD at page 207. 
And lastly, given ALAN'S "personal" situation 
(life-threatening health condition, albeit temporary, 
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coupled with his advanced age mid-50s) , perhaps he 
ought to be able (and judicially allowed, short of 
actual "retirement") to "slow down" and perhaps live a 
little "better", if not longer. Seemingly, LYNDA (and 
perhaps even the District Court) would apparently just 
as easily see ALAN "die in the harness" as he struggled 
to fulfill his economic "obligation" to pay the 
alimony. 
In describing the foregoing, the District Court's 
"findings" are illuminating, to say the least. The 
FINDINGS provide, in relevant part: 
4. This Court finds that the Respondent's 
current under-employment is not necessitated 
by any health concerns or physical impediments 
of the Respondent. To the contrary, the 
Respondent testified at trial that he was 
currently in good health. This Court agrees 
with the contention of Respondent's counsel 
that the Respondent left Lawson simply because 
he intended to earn less money. 
5. This Court finds that while a person is 
free to change careers or choose to earn less 
money; this voluntary act does not obviate 
one's alimony obligation. Therefore, this 
Court will impute to the Respondent the full 
amount of income represented by his earning 
history prior to his voluntary departure from 
Lawson Products. 
6. In contrast to the Respondent's voluntary 
choice to leave his previous employment to 
earn less money, the Petitioner has steadily 
progressed in her career and now earns 
approximately double of what she earned at the 
time of the Decree of Divorce. This Court 
further finds it ironic that it is the fruits 
of the Petitioner's hard work and diligence 
that now provide the sole legal basis for the 
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Respondent to claim a change of circumstance 
and seek to modify his alimony obligation. 
7. This Court finds that, using the 
Petitioner's reasonable financial needs as a 
reference point, that the Petitioner is 
entitled to an amount of alimony that will 
meet her unmet financial needs. 
8. This Court finds that the Petitioner's 
attested unmet financial need of $300.00 per 
month is understated. By taking into account 
the reasonable amount of expenses associated 
with clothing and dry-cleaning, this Court 
finds that the petitioner's unmet financial 
needs are closer to $500.00 per month. 
FINDINGS OF FACT. RECORD at pp. 282-283. Emphasis 
added. 
The Court's FINDING #4 (last sentence) is 
misleading and a "play on words": of course ALAN left 
Lawson, and arguably with the result that he might earn 
less money. But ALAN wasn't going to continue to work 
for Lawson (at $23k per year, gross earnings), doing 
the same job for which he was formerly paid in the $60s 
and 70s (thousands) for previously! Particularly when 
he had the $16,800 "alimony obligation" (District 
Court's terminology) facing him. Secondly, why 
shouldn't he be able to choose to earn less? LYNDA at 
then $40,000 per year was certainly supporting 
herself adequately. 
The Court's FINDING #6 (Court "finds it ironic" 
that Lynda's earnings . . .) "misses the mark". The 
District Court's analysis LYNDA'S "hard work and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
diligence" misses the point: she, for reasons of her 
own choosing, perhaps skill, luck, good fortune, 
smarts, whatever, is capable of earning $50,000. And 
does so! [LYNDA isn't earning $50k working day-and-
night, at three jobs, to make ends meet; she does so at 
a single job with salaried position.] So the judicial 
inquiry ought to be focused upon the judicial/statutory 
phrasing: "the ability of the recipient spouse to 
provide adequate income herself" (or wording to that 
effect) . 
In light of the foregoing evidence and arguments 
which can be raised (i.e. failure to realistically 
analyze the parties' individualized situations, 
regardless of the perceived causes of those situation), 
the District Court's "Findings" border on being 
insufficient. See, for example, Hall vs Hall, 858 P. 2d 
1018 (Utah App 1993) [trial court abuses its discretion 
in determining financial interests of divorced parties 
when it fails to enter specific, detailed findings 
supporting its financial determinations; findings are 
adequate only if they are sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose steps by 
which ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached]; Williamson vs Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, 
983 P.2d 1103 (1999) [trial court must make findings of 
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fact based on factors enumerated in statute governing 
proceeding to modify divorce decree]; and Willey vs 
Willey, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah App 1993) [trial court must 
make sufficiently detailed findings on each of the 
governing factors to enable reviewing court to insure 
the trial court's discretionary determination was 
rationally based upon those factors] . 
In the foregoing, the District Court whether or 
not ALAN stayed with Lawson (at $23k annually) or not--
-made no "finding" as to the effect upon ALAN (i.e. his 
"ability to provide support"). As noted in ALAN'S 
opening BRIEF, the "equitable" comparison of the two 
parties' relative incomes would nevertheless prove to 
be "inequitable", even visibly so: ALAN at $23k, LYNDA 
at $50k, and he's expected ("obligated") to give her 
$6k (or $16k) , with the resultant disparity (even if he 
gives her only $6k): 
LYNDA has $5 6k in annualized "income", 
including alimony. 
ALAN has $17k in annualized albeit 
"imputed" "income", because the Court 
ignored the unrebutted testimony: ALAN earns 
what he earns, regardless of the "subjective" 
reasons therefor. 
II 
TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO RENDER JUDGMENT 
(I.E. MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY) RETROACTIVELY 
CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Ex-wife LYNDA advances [see Page 20 et seq of her 
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BRIEF] a disingenuous and improperly-analyzed argument 
with respect to the "retroactivity" of the alimony 
modification. LYNDA claims that the trial court has 
"discretion" to render the award "retroactive" (to time 
of filing) or not. This analysis contradicts the 
statutory principles which LYNDA purports to analyze, 
albeit incorrectly applicable to the situation. 
Section 78-45-9.4(4), Utah Code, provides in 
relevant part: 
(4) A child or spousal support payment made 
under a child support order may be modified 
with respect to any period during which a 
modification is pending, but only from the 
date of service of the pleading on the 
obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or 
on the obligor, if the obligee is the 
petitioner. If the tribunal orders that the 
support should be modified, the effective date 
of the modification shall be the month 
following service on the parent whose support 
is affected. Once the tribunal determines that 
a modification is appropriate, the tribunal 
shall order a judgment be entered for any 
difference in the original order and the 
modified amount for the period from the 
service of the pleading until the final order 
of modification is entered. 
Emphasis added. 
That the foregoing provisions are applicable 
notwithstanding LYNDA's assertions to the contrary to 
the situation at hand (i.e. ALAN's petition for 
modification) arises from several factors: 
1. First, the statute utilizes the phrase 
"spousal support", and that is exactly what we 
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have here. [To follow LYNDA'S arguments, the 
Court would have to ignore the legislatively-
selected term and, essentially, "write the 
term out" of the statute. The judicial branch 
has neither that responsibility nor the power 
to do so. Judges must interpret the law as 
written. In construing statutes, it is 
presumed that the Legislature chose the 
specific wording advisedly, and intended 
meaning and effect be given to each word 
selected. 
2. Secondly, that the provisions of Section 
78-45-9.4(4), Utah Code, apply to the 
situation at hand ("modification" of "spousal 
support") arises and flows from the definition 
of "child support order", as "defined" in 
Section 78-45-2(8), Utah Code, thus: 
(8) "Child support order" or 
"support order" means a judgment, 
decree, or order of a tribunal 
whether interlocutory or final, 
whether or not prospectively or 
retroactively modifiable, whether 
incidental to a proceeding for 
divorce, judicial or legal 
separation, separate maintenance, 
paternity, guardianship, civil 
protection, or otherwise which: 
(a) establishes or 
modifies child support; . 
Emphasis added. From the foregoing text, the 
i n 
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following analysis is pertinent: 
First, the original [19 92] Divorce 
Decree provided for "child support", 
thus bringing the parties' situation 
within the ambit of the phrasing 
"child support order" and the 
application of Section 7 8-45-9.4(4) . 
That the situation is more extensive 
than merely "child support" is 
confirmed not only by the phrase 
"spousal support" as utilized in 
Section 78-45-9.4(4), Utah Code, as 
described above, as well as the 
selected statutory terms describing 
"divorce, judicial or legal 
separation, [and] separate 
maintenance" which apply to spouse 
or ex-spouse (or soon-to-be ex-
spouse) situations. 
Secondly, the District Court, not only "found" 
the pertinent "material change of 
circumstances" (which LYNDA now, finally, 
acknowledges), but actually "ordered" the 
judicial "modification" of the alimony award. 
The essential statutory criteria are each 
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individually satisfied. 
Factually, ALAN filed his petition for modification 
in October 2000; the petition was "served" upon LYNDA 
in November 2000. Thus, under the provisions of Section 
78-45-9.4(4), the petition for "modification", when 
ultimately granted, should have been retroactive to 
December 2000 the month immediately following the 
month in which LYNDA was served with the "petition for 
modification". Thus, from December 2000 forward, the 
"alimony" award should have been the $500 per month the 
Court ultimately ordered.1 Thus, the District Court's 
award of the $30,000 or so "judgment" [May 2003; RECORD 
at 181] against ALAN and arising from and/or within the 
"order to show cause proceedings" which the Court 
entertained simultaneously with the "modification" 
proceeding is, for these reasons alone, invalid as 
being in conflict with the statute, and must be set 
aside. The District Court, on this narrow issue, has NO 
"discretion", because the statute gives the judge no 
discretion: that statute says "shall", and that term is 
consistently recognized to be MANDATORY! 
xThat ALAN asserts in this paragraph "the alimony 
should have been the $500 amount" ultimately decreed by 
the District Court (in 2003) should not be 
improvidently construed to be an abandonment of ALAN'S 
global position that the alimony should be even less, 
perhaps zero, based upon LYNDA'S "needs" (or non-needs, 
as the situation actually is). 
n o 
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In similar fashion, the "retroactivity" of the 
entitlement is premised upon widespread judicial | 
acceptance that such "petitions for modification" are 
effective "retroactively" (i.e. to the date of 
"filing" or more accurately, the date of service upon 
the responding ex-spouse) ; that judicial acceptance 
arises from the correct interpretation and application 
of Section 78-45-9.4(4), Utah Code, as analyzed above. 
Likewise, the specific "facts" material to the 
District Court's determination [i.e. "material change 
of circumstance" pertinent to ALAN'S diminished income 
(i.e. "ability of payor spouse to provide alimony 
support") as well as LYNDA'S claimed "need" for < 
continuing alimony support] were essentially unchanged 
during the entirety of the "modification" proceeding. 
With respect to ALAN'S income, his "income" was 
essentially reduced to the $8.00 per hour 
(approximately $16,000 per year) range and that 
< 
doesn't reflect those periods of time when he was 
hospitalized with a bleeding esophagus, in a comatose 
condition for days, and "under doctor's order" to 
refrain from working for a year following discharge 
from the hospital which "doctor's orders" he was 
obligated, notwithstanding the continuing < 
jeopardization of his heath, to disregard. [See RECORD 
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at 196: physician's written "No work for 12 months" 
directive. Emphasis in original document.] If the 
"modification" of the alimony amount is justified 
which it certainly is prospectively (from 2003 
forward), by reason of ALAN'S inability to provide 
support at the former amount, then the "inability" 
should likewise extend "retroactively" back to the date 
of the service of the "petition to modify" upon LYNDA: 
November 2000, as the statute provides. 
LYNDA also argues [pp. 21-22 of her BRIEF] that the 
duration of time that the "modification" proceeding 
took should be held against ALAN, as the moving party. 
LYNDA'S observations and arguments on this point are 
disingenuous and misleading, for a number of reasons. 
1. LYNDA'S arguments ignore the fact that 
given the obvious "material change of 
circumstance", she has resisted even up to the 
date of trial before the District Court, any 
"modification" whatsoever. Notwithstanding her 
$50,000 annual salary, good health, no 
dependents, and similar factors arguably 
pertinent to an "alimony" analysis on "her 
side" of the alimony equation and disregarding 
ALAN'S hospitalization, diminished earning 
capacity, inability to find employment 
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commensurate with his skills, and so forth, 
LYNDA continued "hold out" for the entire 
$16,800 annual amount originally decreed when 
ALAN'S income (and/or "earning capacity") was 
significantly many times what it presently is. 
2. Not only did LYNDA procedurally resist 
the "modification" and assumed a hard-line, 
stonewall stance vis-a-vis the "modification" 
and now-conceded (by her, but only after the 
District Court has so "found") "material 
change of circumstances", but in her obviously 
superior economic and health position, she 
filed numerous "show cause" petitions for 
"orders to show cause" for judgments for 
unpaid alimony. Such had the effect of 
diverting what precious little resources ALAN 
did have for the litigation effort from the 
main proceeding of his choosing; LYNDA is in 
no position to complain as to the length of 
time the "modification" proceeding actually 
took. Likewise, any perceived "delay" in the 
proceedings arguably worked in favor of LYNDA: 
over time, ALAN'S continuing efforts to better 
his financial position by seeking employment 
(albeit in Montana) which was more 
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commensurate and rewarding economically with 
his skills may have been successful, and she 
would arguably have reaped the benefit 
thereof. Similarly, she has been unable to 
identify any economic or legal detriment 
sustained by reason of such claimed "delay". 
3. Thirdly, the length of time is actually 
immaterial to LYNDA'S interests. If, for 
example, the case were instantaneously 
adjudicated in snapshot fashion by the 
District Court in December 2000 based upon the 
evidence ultimately available to the District 
Court2, the alimony award would still have 
been reduced to the $500 monthly amount. That 
prospective "judgment" (i.e. "modification") 
would effectively operate to deprive her of 
any "post-judgment" amounts (i.e. the 
difference from the $1600 per month 
originally). Thus, LYNDA shouldn't have any 
basis for complaint; how long the 
"modification" proceeding actually took to 
litigate with or with any pauses or breaks, 
explained or not is immaterial to her 
2ALAN's original BRIEF identifies the potential 
dangers in proceeding too quickly in haste to arrive at 
a judicial determination. 
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interests. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's award of $500 monthly alimony 
was improperly adjudicated against ALAN: not upon the 
statutory criteria (her "needs" as contrasted with her 
"wants" and/or as described as her "expenses"; her 
presently-manifested her ability to provide for her own 
support; and his own inability to provide support, 
particularly in the inequitably-excessive amounts 
dictated by the Court), but rather from the Court's 
misanalysis of the situation at hand. Not only did the 
District Court "abuse its discretion" in effecting the 
award (by ignoring those criteria and/or by overlooking 
the evidence, in the Court's zeal to concentrate upon 
the "obligation"), but the Court has implemented a 
truly "inequitable" result which is readily apparent. 
The District Court's continuing, myopic focus upon 
ALAN'S "obligation" which is not the issue before the 
Court to the seeming exclusion of examining LYNDA'S 
economic situation (i.e. actual need, ability to 
support self, and so forth) , including the lack of any 
specific findings and analysis the specific impact upon 
the parties themselves, is an abuse of discretion and 
cannot support the inequitable alimony award. The $500 
per month is facially "inequitable", given the evidence 
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before the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of January, 
2005. 
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